”By substance we can understand nothing else than an entity which is in such a way that it needs no other entity in order to be.” So Descartes, quoted by Heidegger in his critique (Being and Time 125). Heidegger continues, ‘That whose Being is such that it has no need at all for any other entiry satisfies the idea of substance in the authentic sense; this entity is the ens perfectissimum.’ And this entity, according to Descartes, can be none other than God, for no other entity has no need of any other.
Heidegger points out a problem with this conception of Being: ‘Every entity which is not God is an ens creatum. The Being which belongs to one of these entities is “infinitely” different from that which belongs to the other; yet we still consider creation and creator alike as entities. We are thus using “Being” in so wide a sense that its meaning embraces an “infinite” difference.”
In resolving this difficulty one might simply point back to that passage earlier in Being and Time where Heidegger reminds us that ‘The Being of entities “is” not itself an entity.’ (26) I want to draw attention, however, to something else Heidegger writes in connection with Descartes’ designation as God of that unique substance which has no need of any other. ‘Here “God” is a purely ontological term, if it is to be understood as ens perfectissimum,’ he says. God only arises in Descartes’ analysis of Being, that is, as a term necessary to Descartes – Descartes is the thinking subject, God the equipment, ready-to-hand for the philosopher. [1] The problem is not merely that Descartes has failed to preserve God’s alterity, but that he has pressed God into service for his agenda, wielding him as an eminently manageable tool.
Consider, by contrast, the oddly Heideggerian language of Jeremiah 23: ‘Am I a God at hand, declares the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can a man hide himself in secret places so that I cannot see him? declares the Lord. Do I not fill heaven and earth? declares the Lord. … Is not my word like fire, declares the Lord, and like a hammer that breaks the rock in pieces?’
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[1] The roots of this use of God in philosophy can be traced back much further, at least to Aristotle, as Heidegger knew (cf. his 1929 What is Metaphysics?). In defining what we know as metaphysics but which he referred to as wisdom or first philosophy, Aristotle wrote that it deals with ‘things that are both separable [i.e. outside of space] and immovable [which includes being outside of time].’ This first philosophy could be called theology because ‘it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in things of this kind.’ (Metaphysics 1026a13ff.)
